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Brexit is the ‘shock’ that united Europe according to the President-elect of the
Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. There’s certainly an element of truth to this.
Despite some occasional signs of disagreement, the EU-27 have given every show
of maintaining a unified position in all stages of the Brexit process so far. This is
in clear contrast to the UK, as three years of uncertainty and disagreement have
coalesced into a toxic mix of political and legal dysfunction, leaving the country so
divided as to cause UK authorities to lurch from one crisis to the next. The UK is
currently scheduled to withdraw from the EU on 31 January 2020. This deadline,
however, is no more certain than the last three Article 50 TEU deadlines, as the
general election (the second since Article 50 TEU was triggered in March 2017
and which has put temporary pause to Brexit negotiations) may not provide any
resolution either in the short or medium term.
Briefly, a Conservative majority would likely result in the ratification of the current
Withdrawal Agreement on or before 31 January 2019, but could also mean the
increased likelihood of a ‘no deal’ Brexit at the end of the transition period which
follows it. A UK government led by the Labour party could mean a request to the
EU-27 for a further extensionin order to renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement
and/or facilitate a further referendum on EU Membership. Although highly unlikely,
an alternative ‘Remain’ government could be elected to revoke the Article 50 TEU
notification and stop Brexit entirely. Another possible result, however, is another
hung Parliament: a government leading Brexit negotiations without a majority of
support in Parliament. With only four weeks before a general election, there’s little
certainty as to what the 2019-2024 (at least on paper) UK government will be.
If, however, the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified following the election of a
parliamentary majority favourable to it, the VDL Commission will be then tasked with
the most challenging part of negotiations: the agreement on the future relationship
between the UK and the EU. It is at this point that ‘unity’ or a common position
among the EU-27 is both most essential and most challenging. Concurrently with
Brexit negotiations, two Member States, Hungary and Poland, are subject to special
EU scrutiny under Article 7(1) TEU for breaches of the EU’s fundamental values
such as the rule of law. It was never expected that either Article 50 TEU nor Article 7
TEU would be activated, and certainly never all at the same time.
Regarding the rule of law, strong concerns have been raised with regard to von der
Leyen’s ‘unclear’ position on upholding fundamental values, and her ostensible if
not pusillanimous deference to dialogue to avoid an ‘East/West rift’ on matters of
the rule of law as ‘nobody’s perfect’. There may be a tempting political expediency
of prioritising a unified position on Brexit (no doubt in ‘protection of the European
project as a whole’) above holding individual Member States’ governments’ to
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account for measures which further and entrench rule of law backsliding. There
are few indications, as of yet, of von der Leyen’s stance on the question of Brexit,
beyond the intention to ‘strive for an orderly Brexit’ (echoing the language of former
UK prime minister, Theresa May which of itself is no more meaningful than ‘Brexit
means Brexit’). She has also reiterated the commitment of the last Commission to
show solidarity with Member States most effected by Brexit. She stated it ‘would
be wrong to see Brexit only as the end of something’, underlining the importance of
the way in which the Brexit process is carried out will be determinative off the future
relationship. While a commentator for Brexit Central celebrated her appointment as
one to ‘stand-up against the Commission Establishment’ and not aim to ‘make an
example of’ the UK, there’s little from which to discern that the VDL Commission
strategy will in any way be a departure from that of the Juncker Commission. 
The way in which negotiations are conducted, the content of those agreements,
and the necessary compromises both internally within the Union and bilaterally with
the UK will present complex challenges from a rule of law perspective for the VDL
Commission. This post aims to outline only some of those challenges, and highlight
outstanding issues, in the years of the Brexit process ahead.
Brexit can always deliver delays
Familiar to Brexit, the 2019-2024 European Commission led by von der Leyen has
been delayed. The VDL Commission was due to be in position by 1 November
2019, but was postponed by a month following the rejection of three commission
nominees. Despite the contentious approval of the (second) Hungarian nominee
to lead a portfolio requiring inter alia the promotion of values which the Hungarian
government is credibly accused of having systematically violated, von der Leyen still
does not have a full College of Commissioners as the UK government has refused to
nominate one, triggering an infringement action initiated by the Commission. While
the UK government has cited the prohibition on nominating senior international posts
in advance of a general election, the UK government’s (political) intransigence on
this EU legal obligation predates the election period. The European Council made
the appointment of a Commissioner a condition of a further extension to January
2020, as such an extension of UK membership ‘cannot be allowed to undermine the
regular functioning of the Union and its institutions’.
The prohibition on senior international appointment during an election is, in
any event, as convincing as the rationale Johnson put forward to prorogue the
Parliament, and which the UK Supreme Court found to have been ‘unlawful, null, and
of no effect’. The CJEU has held that no provision (even a constitutional one) can
justify a failure to observe EU obligations. While some have argued that the lack of
a UK Commissioner under such circumstances should not, and will not, prevent the
confirmation of the VDL Commission, for there to be such an exception could create
an unwelcome precedent. It is not in the interests of either the EU Institutions or the
Member States for a Commission to be (legally) functional without representation of
all Member States.
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A Tailor-Made Approach to Transparency
Acting under a negotiation mandate of the European Council, the Commission leads
negotiations on behalf of the EU. UK attempts to undermine this role by negotiating
directly with individual Member States have been unsuccessful as the EU-27 have
‘maintained extraordinary self-discipline and loyalty among themselves.’ Essential to
this unity has no doubt been the transparency of Juncker Commission’s work during
negotiations, early called for by the European Parliament.
Due to the ‘unprecedented’ nature of the Brexit negotiations, the Junker Commission
adopted a ‘tailor-made’ approach to transparency. Documents shared among
Member States and EU Institutions and with the UK have been publicly released
including meeting agendas, position papers, and text proposals. For Brexit legal
commentators, such an accessible source of information has been a welcome
relief and contrast to the years of unpublished, inconsistent, and often contradictory
positions and ‘non-papers’ taken by the five different UK Brexit Ministers and
chief negotiators since 2016. As highlighted by the Commission in the European
Ombudsman report on their work, the approach taken to transparency ‘served to
enhance the legitimacy of the Commission and the EU in these negotiations.
It has also helped keep the EU united as all key stakeholders were informed at
every step.’
Such transparency is rightly to be lauded, and it should be equally a priority of
the VDL Commission. It does, however, stand in stark contrast to the lack of
transparency in the Commission’s actions taken under the rule of law framework,
and latterly under the Article 7(1) TEU procedures on Poland and Hungary. Where
the legitimacy of the Commission and EU are enhanced, and unity served by such
clear and public disclosures, it seems incongruent that measures taken by the
Commission where there is ‘clear risk of serious breach’ of EU values and Member
State responses to them are largely publicly unknowable. The wealth of information
on Brexit negotiations and preparations for ‘no deal’ eventualities centrally published
by the Commission, serve only to highlight the poverty as regards information on
actions taken with regard to corruption and rule of law infringement actions. As
Laurent Pech writes, there can be no ‘more pressing overriding public interest than
a situation in which the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU’s
foundational values is alleged in respect of a Member State.’ Perhaps the rule of
politics is clear on this one: when a Member is leaving, values are unifying; but for
Member States remaining, such same values are seen (unjustifiably) as divisive.
The Withdrawal Agreement
The “new” draft Withdrawal Agreement, now in stasis during the UK general election,
received positive assessment from von der Leyen who called it ‘good for people
and good for the single market’. It was agreed in principle between Boris Johnson’s
government and Commission negotiators only two weeks before the then Article
50 TEU deadline of 31 October 2019. However, even where the draft Withdrawal
Agreement finalised between UK and EU negotiators is largely the same as that
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negotiated by Theresa May, it was not given anywhere near adequate time for
sufficient consideration to be done by the UK and EU Parliaments both of which
were required to give their consent for the Agreement to be ratified. Only a few of the
issues from a rule of law perspective are herein outlined.
First, the most significant change of the WA was the introduction of the Northern
Ireland Protocol. Despite its statements on the customs unity of the UK, the Protocol
will in practical effect separate Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK on matters of
customs, excise, state aid, in addition to certain annexed regulatory regimes. Though
considered a success for Ireland in that it would negate the need for a regulatory
and customs border on the island, the practical arrangements and detail as to the
workability of the agreement have not yet been sufficiently clarified leaving significant
scope for ongoing legal uncertainty for citizens and businesses. For example, the
definition of ‘goods’ ‘at risk’ of being moved into the EU from Great Britain or a
third country via Northern Ireland and so subject to tariffs to be decided by a Joint
Committee is still unknown.
The Protocol will guarantee continued, if not indefinite, CJEU oversight. Northern
Irish Courts will have capacity to refer questions to the CJEU under the Article 267
TFEU mechanism. Such EU judicial oversight in some areas and in one part of
the UK, could create a significant degree of legal uncertainty and compounds the
likelihood of regulatory and wider legal divergence within the UK. Uncertainty will
also arise where there are legal disputes in areas which are covered (eg EU state
aid provisions) and not covered (eg competition law prohibition of cartels) by the
Protocol.
A compromise to the UK red line on the CJEU, a new Joint Committee chaired by
both UK and EU representatives will oversee the implementation of the Withdrawal
Agreement, and be able to adopt binding decisions amending the Agreement. The
detail as how it will be constituted, how often it will meet beyond ‘at least once a
year’, and the range and extent of its duties has left much to be desired and more
to be concerned about. The functional capacity of the Joint Committee as oversight
body of the entire Withdrawal Agreement is limited, which is of particular concern to
for the protection of resident EU citizens’ rights in the UK, as of those of UK citizens
resident in the EU. Regarding EU citizens in the UK alone, significant concerns
remain regarding the open ended nature of the terms used in regards to citizens’
rights, the diminution of family and workers’ rights, lack of recognition given to
unprotected groups, the lack of physical documentation to prove status, reliance
on a data-leaking and insecure phone app, the lack of access to justice and judicial
review for administrative error, the end of non-discrimination, the reduction and
removal of democratic voting rights for EU and local elections, and the overall and
permanent insecurity of reliance on secondary legislation to incorporate citizens’
rights which can be changed by delegated legislative powers of a government
minister.
Even where the WA is ratified: these issues have not been resolved.
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This is only the beginning
If the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified on or before 31 January 2020, the UK will
withdraw from the EU and the next transition period will begin, ending in December
2020. Article 218 TFEU, rather than Article 50 TEU, will determine the process of
negotiations, and the VDL Commission will have only 11 months to negotiate with
the UK the conclusion of an agreement on the future relationship spanning inter
alia trade and economic cooperation, mobility, transport and aviation, data transfer,
services and investment, ensuring a level playing field for fair competition, law
enforcement and criminal justice, and even matters of foreign policy, security and
defence. Finding optimal positions and conditions on the UK’s continued access to
the internal market which neither compromise the functioning of the Single Market
and the four freedoms, nor incentivises bilateralism through the alienation of Member
States, nor causes severe economic damage to the UK and the EU, will be a
herculean task for the VDL Commission to say the least.
Already raised as a concerning point of contention is the move of the guarantee of
a level playing field from the legally-binding Withdrawal Agreement to the Political
Declaration on the future relationship between the UK and EU. Plausibly, the UK
could adopt lower standards on consumer, worker, environmental protections
than those within the EU in effort to attract trade and investment, putting closer
neighbours at an extreme competitive disadvantage which could incentivise some
Member States to push for a similar regulatory trajectory. Similar concerns for legal
certainty, judicial review, and democratic input within the Withdrawal Agreement
will be compounded in a future agreement between the UK and the EU particularly
where time is even shorter. The transition period may only be extended once by
two years to December 2022. This timeline for negotiations will determined by the
Withdrawal Agreement, not Article 50 TEU. There is no mechanism for extension
by request of the UK and unanimous approval of the Council under the Withdrawal
Agreement.
In saying that it is wrong to think of Brexit as an ending, von der Leyen was entirely
apt: these past three years have only been the beginning. The next five years of
the VDL Commission will be dominated by the opposing and existential challenges
of one Member State withdrawing and other Members States departing from the
fundamental values of the European Union. How ultimately the VDL Commission will
be characterised will depend on whether it chooses unity with values, or over them.
- 5 -
